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Introduction
Iromcally, Operation DESERT STORM was at once a vxtory for ax pomer theonsts, and a shtfi away from iimdamental air power theory since 19 17 Coalmon air power m 199 1 did not contnbute to the defeat of Iraq by collapsmg the nation, but by degradmg the military and stnppmg away Iraq's security The war's conduct signaled that Unlted States (U.S.) au-power theory is shlftmg focus toward a counter-military strategy, and away from attacks on the societal fabnc or national will Five elements Justify and cause this change Amencan morality, lessons of hlstory, costs of nation-fiulldmg, increased mformatlon flow, and evolvmg technology This shift 1s not only appropnate wlthm the current global strategx sltuatlon, it should go fixther However, this shift IS & appropnat,e today because of the strong relative air power advantage the U S holds over potential adbersarlqs The danger 1s that this fleeting window of asymmetric supenonty will slam shut before war fighting theory suffklently evolves This paper traces the evolution of U S ax power theory It will illustrate the recent shift m anpower theory today and discuss why the change should progress even more The paper's scope 1s limited, however, to a discussion of conventional, inter-state warfare between modem nations-the "major theater war" construct of current Department of Defense strategic planning 2
Evolution of United States Air Power Theory -4 modern state IS such a complex and mterdependentfabnc that It qJ%ers a target hzghiv sensttve to a sudden and overwhelnwtg blowwfrom the mr B H Liddell Har?
The mllltary strategic end m war remains constant Capltulatlon and the lmposltlon of our will on the polmcal leadership of the adversary However, the strategic level ways to accomphsh such lmposltlon contmuously evolve Vanous phllosophles differ m the degree to which an-power can and should mflpence each of three aspects of a modem mdustnal adversary to compel a certain behavior _ ,4s illustrated m Figure 1 , the three elements are the to the ground combat umts But. he envisioned defeating an enemy not by bombing its troops, but I Utlmately; m .hlttmg an enemy's great nerve centers at the very begmmng of the war so as to paralyze I them to the greatest extent possible 'A Lieutenant Colonel Edgar S Gorrell of the &r Service's Technical Section converted Mitchell's ilslon from theory to a plan Recogmzmg that the German army relied on a few key war / I mdustnes and transportation nodes, Gorrell and his staff developed an air operations plan focusmg strategc bombing against these targets The plan directed sequential an-attacks against the four key regions of /iIusseldorf, Cologne. Mannhelm, and the Saar 6
Mitchell and Gorrell developed two significant, though unproven, features of strategc air thought First, air power could Impart agmficantly more influence on the outcome of a war by attackmg $to the heart of an enemy natlon versus attackmg soldiers on the front lme Second, the crucral targets m the enemy nation were those mdustrtes upon which its army relied, such as mumtlon plants They emphasized. then, the indirect attack of the army, not the nation*s paralysis or collapse. and on physical war makmg capacity, not the national will These concepts would change and evolve m the years buildmg up to WW II as mdustnal societies became more complex and contnbuted more and B H Lrddell Hart each drew then own specific lessons from WW I as to the potential of an attacks Then wntmgs influenced the -4CTS officers to varying degrees They each concluded that strategrc bombing served as a powerful means to defeat an mdustnahzed nation-state m a manner less costly than the bloody trench combat of the WW I. but they differed m then theones on the appropnate lvqs to employ that bombing They differed in then-opmrons as to what constituted a strategic center of gravity (COG) for a nation-state, the vital centers (mdustry. commumcatrons, oil, food centers, etc ). the national will, the army, or a combmation of the three In the U S , the ACTS prepared a course text m 1926 titled Employment of Combzneddzr Force which emphasized the destructron of the enemy's morale, not hrs armies, as the goal of war and of strategrc au power The means of breaking the morale was through attacks on the enemy nation-s vital centers, mdustry and transportation, but not necessarily through direct attack on crvrlrans 7
In the 193Cs ACTS thought shifted to the "mdustnal web theory," a concept closely modeled from Gorrell's recently rediscovered strategrc bombing plan of WW I The mdustnal web theory stipulated that (1) In "modem warfare," the mrlltary, polmcal, economic, and social facets of a nation's existence were so "closely and absolutely interdependent" that mterruption of the delicate balance could suffice to defeat an enemy state, (2) strategic bombmg, precisely armed at these "vital centers" of an enemy's mdustrral complex, could wreck the fiaglle equlllbnum and hence destroy the enemy state's war-making capability, and (3) such destruction would also wreck the enemy nation's capacity to sustam normal day-to-day life, which would m turn destroy the w111 of its populace to fight ' This theory clearly sou-&t the collapse of the natlon, not the destruction of the army, as its end state Collapse would occur through the destruction of national "orgamc systems"g and not merely war matenel factones -4ddltlonally, the theory reflected the American military reluctance to target 1 clv~hans physically
The ACTS faculty analyzed the most efficient and effective means to defeat a modem nation The Unzted States Strategrc Bombrng Surveys (USSSS) of WW II concluded that the strategic bombmg efl?orts m Europe were crmcal to vrctory. alben with room for Improvement. thus vahdatmg the pre-war doctrme of ACTS and the -AWPD Whrle the attacks on most systems were meffective due to German reburldmg and dispersal efforts. as well as slack m the production potential, the attacks on two key categones proved essential or1 and transportation l5 The USSBS stated that even though Germany z&111 had a fielded army at the end of the war. "with the rmpendmg collapse of the supportmg economy, mdrcatrons are convmcmg that they would have had to cease fightmg wrthm a few months *A'
Just as srgmficant, however, 1s the USSBS conclusion on the psychological domain aspect of the mdustnal-web theory
The mental reactron of the German people to an attack 1s srgmticant Under ruthless Tazr control they showed surpnsmg resistance to the terror and hardships of repeated an 'attack, to the destructron of their homes and belongings, and to the condmons under whrch they were reduced to live Then morale. then belief m ultimate victory or sat\sfactory compromrse, and their confidence m then leaders declined. but they contmued to work effrcrently as long as the physical means of production remamed The power of a police state over its people cannot be underestrmated I7
The results of this war and those to come support the notion that predictmg and measurmg the impact of bombing on the mtangible of natronal will is difficult. if not lmpossrbie
In the Pacific, Japan proved even more susceptible to the concepts of the mdustnal-web theory Strate~c bombing of the Japanese mainland devastated the country The physical destructron of the bombmg combined with the mterdiction of Japanese shrppmg brought mdustry to a near standstrll The attacks on urban centers, combined with low food productron and increased disease, greatly detenorated crvrhan morale The USSBS research mdrcates that by June 1945, 68 percent of the Japanese believed Japan would lose the war, and "over one-half attributed the pnncrpal cause to an attacks, other than the atomic bombing attacks Sixty-four percent of the populatron stated that they had reached a point pnor to surrender where they felt personally unable to go on wrth the war ""
The WW II case study illustrates the dlfflculty m predicting a cause and effect relationship The second reason 1s the lesson from history that impacting a nation-s will m a predictable way through force IS lmposslble Perhaps the greatest failure of Douhet's theory 1s his over-slmphfied notion of being able to cause immediate moral collapse of a society through bombing The major wars of ths century have proven that mdlvlduals and socletles can withstand tremendous physical, mental, and economic pam before succumbmg -Addalonally, history has shown that the time required to sufflclently pressure a population, when able to at all, 1s long and incongruent with the Anencan notlon of 'quick, declslve" combat. And, even after passing the threshold of pain populations do not always respond as predicted North Korea today provides a valuable example The degree of economic collapse, suffermg, and starvation already exceeds that which many strategsts would say 1s necessary m a natlo&state confhct to stimulate a popular upnsmg against the government And yet, North Korea contmues to survive under totahtarlan rule
The thn-d reason 1s that of the cost of reconstruction The broad aim of any WU, at the grand strategc level, will always be to create a better peace after the conflict Destruction of a mllltary or a nation may occur, but should never be an end m Itself Even after the defeat of Nazi Germany m WW II, the economic devastation of Europe nearly resulted m Communist revolutions m France, Italy.
western Germany, and Greece Only the influx of bllllons of dollars of U S iimds for reconstruction staved off the revolts It would have been hard to claim success m WW II if 'tlctory" resulted m the loss of continental Europe to the Soviet sphere The U S has a long hlstory this century of spending enormous'sums of money to rebuild natlons after conflict The U S economy was able to absorb such a burden after the two world wars and Korean confhct, but not wthout stram However, air strategists today sense that the ability exists to achieve desired strategic and operational effects wlthout large scale destyctlon
The next reason for the shlfi m air power theory 1s technology that allows pubhc observation of war m almost real time This aspect mtertwmes with the previous two m that the U S public must hake I knowledge and vlsuahzatlon of the horrors of war to spark the large-scale outcry against the war's conduct Today's high technology media provides such a capablhty A democratic I.?' S government and mlhtary must constantly consider domestic pohtxs when planning and executmg the ends, ways, and means' of any conflict The modem media greatly influences these domestic pohtlcs and public opmlon Likewise, military strategsts must balance the means necessary to achieve ObJectIves. with the Impact of such means on pubhc support of the effort The final reason for the shlfi IS advancement m ax power technology that allows a greater degree of dlscnmmatlon m the conduct of war This fact, combmed with the public's ability to \lew this tech&logy m action made a significant and lastmg Impression dunng the Persian Gulf War
The precision and damage hmltatlon partxularly Impressed reporters m Baghdad and thqse who vlslted the city afterward Michael Kelly, a freelance writer reportmg for the Xeiv Republzc, was m Baghdad durmg the mmal F-l 17 and TL,XM [Tomahawk Land Att,ack Msslle] attacks On the mommg after the first nights's stnkes, he watched smoke pounng from the Mmstry of Defense. which had taken a TLAM hit, and saw, m quick successlon, two more TLAMs leave It "a burning rubble " But, he noted. "the hoqpltal next to it though was untouched, and so were the homes crowded around It *-It wa's this aspect of modem ax power that seemed to stun observers-that attackers could stnke targets deep wthm urban areas without causing the kmd of wrackmg devastation that had characterized the city raids-even the "precxse ones-of the Second World wq.r 3o
With the advent of precision munmons, and then-perceived success m Iraq, public tolerance IS extremely low for a return to the ulldespread devastation of previous wars While the specific nature of adversary, conflxt, and envn-onment that enabled successtil preclslon air power m Iraq ~111 never be repeated, that war has already condmoned the -Amencan public The expectanon of quicker, cleaner war mth fewer clvlhan casualties and lower collateral damage resulted from DESERT STORM Sow that precision attack allows far greater dlscnmmatlon. the natlon demands it
Conclusions
The shlfi m strategic level focus to a greater emphasis on disabling the adversary mlhtarJI IS both feasible and appropnate Au-theonsts m the first half of this century did not abandon such a focus because it would fall to achieve the strategic obJectIves They moted away from this focus because the means did not exist to execute the strategy In other words, rapldly crushmg the enemy's mllltary m Xapoleomc fashion was still the desired strategy. but when the character of mdustnahzed warfare no longer allowed that, a shift to the "societal heart" seemed like a reasonable alternative But, the compromise did not live up to prormse From Hansel1 to Warden, air power theonsts were consistently frustrated by the dlfflculty of achlevmg predictable psychologlcal outcomes from physical destruction
The greatest an-power success m DESERT STORM was not even one expected or desired by Co1
Warden It was the direct (force destruction) and mdu-ect (command and control disruption, and Hungary In 19U Alhed attacks reduced production from the synthetic plants from 3 16,000 tons per month to 5 000 tons Bq 1945 the German Army wtually ground to a halt due to the lack of gasolme -An unexpected side effect of the attacks on synthenc 011 production was the se\ ere Impact It had on the producuon of syntheuc mtrogen methanol. and rubber The loss of much of then mtrogen and methanol production created a shortage o t ammumnon exploslbes and femllzer l6 Umted States AX Force Urnted States Strateac Bombmp; Sun evs, p 38 " Umted States AX Force Lmted States Stratesw Bombmq Sunevs p 39 '* Urnted States PLlr Force Umted States Strateac Bombmg Swe\ s p 95 " John A Warden III The Enemy as a System " Anuow er Journal IX (Sprmg 1995'1 pp J-N9 " The werences and smularmes between the strategc au doctrme and its apphcahon m WW II and ODS are ~sorth notmg whl e many target categones were smnlar m both wars the ObJecme of attackmg those targets wered In ODS d Warden tde ufied the Saddam regnne as the pnmary COG wth attacks on the mfrastructure conmbutmg to lsolatmg Saddam through physical destrucuon and psychologcal impact The WW II au planners \?ewed the kel mdusmes and orgamc systems as the crmcal centers of gral~ty The sun of their destruction was also mofold to destroy the capablhc of the my to contmue the war and to crush the will of the populace Thus merence m the doctrmes was mfluenced bv the technology a\ alable to execute the do&me and the merences m the character of the ts+o wars The authors of the WW II strategx bo bmg concepts were convmced as was Warden. that qwer alone could conceivably end the war but theq also realize that they &d not haI e the technology to a&eve tlxs theoreocal goal Bombing accuracies were so poor that d" the U S could not produce sufficient quantmes of bombers to ache\ e the smmltaneous destmcuon of all the ldentied orgamc system nodes They therefore had to adopt a sequential approach wCh reqmred time. tnne that pernutted the -&us amues to contmue the fight develop new tactics. and repax bomb damage '-' About parallel warfare. Warden states Sta es have a small number of \;ltal targets at the strategic level-m the neighborhood of a few hundred RI tii an aterage of perhaps 10 ampomts per \xal target These targets tend to be small \er_r exipensne. have fern backups and are hard to repax If a slgmficant percentage 1s struck m parallel the damage becbmes msuperable Contrast parallel attack 111th senal attack m &tich only one or mo targets come un er attack m a gnen day (or longer) The enemy can allexqate the effects of senal attacks b Qspersal d oxer tune b mcreasmg the defenses of targets that are hkely to be attacked-by concentratmg hs resources to repax damage to smgle targets and by conducung counteroffensn es Parallel attack depm es h& of the abil@ to respond effectn ely and the greater the percentage of targets hx m a smgle blox% the more nearly lmposslble his response (Warden, "The Enemy as a System " p 54 ) '-' Warden. The Enem! as a System -p 5 1 '_3 Cohen Elrot A _ hector Gulf War Au Power Survey, Vol I Planmng and Command and Control (Washmgton Department of the Ax Force 1993) p 11 2 This number would nse slgmficantly before the war started as ne\% mtelhgence mformatlon am\ ed and CEYICOM revised then plan " The most efficient means of attackmg telecommumcatlons on a wxiespread basks appeared to be through attacbg the electrical poner gnd an element of the key production rmg Instant Thunder s goal was "to reduce Baghdad's power suppl: @ ~1x3 percent and Iraq s as whole b tb-fhe percent See Cohen Gulf War Ax Power Sun e\ Vol I Plamung p 116 "Cohen Gulf War Au Pomer Survev Vol I Plamnng. p 119 " Cohen-Gulf War AN Pomer Surve\ Vol I m p 120 '-' By not amckmg the populace through either dxect destructne means. or producmg long term damage to thex nauonal essexmals such as electnclty Warden hoped to Isolate the central leaderstip COG from the rest of the nanon In general. his model does not &scount dxect attacks on the population as was performed m the total war of the 1940 s HoweLeer the model IS sl tional and based on a dealed am&as of the character of the conflict and the enem! In the case of ODS a lmuted war T om Amenca s perspective the planners and national polmcal leader&p &d not consider the Iraqi pop&&on to be beiligeFents and therefore were not SUbJeCt to attack Addmonally It was clear to the planners that the fra@e national and coalmon will could not x3?thstand the nnpact of large numbers of c~han casualhes See Cohen Gulf War Ax PO% er Sune\ Vol I Plamnngp 120 '8 Cohen Gulf War Au Power Sunev Vol I Planmnq, p 120 Slgmficant m theK absence from the ongmal plan accordmg to the GWAPS were Iraqi arm] manewer umt targets The GWAPS states that l+xth the exception of attacks on Iraq s an defenses and Its deplo@ chenucal Reapons Warden s carnpgn would lea\e Iraq s fielded forces mtact He expected Iraq to svlthdraw from Kuwan ulthout much of a fight * See Cohen. Gulf War An Power Sune\ Vol I Plannmg. p 112 Colonel &chard Reynolds Heart of the Storm protldes a more detaded and accurate account of 0us SubJect On 10 August 1990. Warden bnefed General Schwankopf that the 'ground forces m Kunalt and those m Iraq near or on the border nould be attacked only If they attempted to moxe fomard mto Sau& Arabia ' (p 55) Durmg an 11 Aug bnefing to General Cohn Po'FIell. Chauman of the JCS 'Warden explamed that he named to ht the Repubhcau Guard m Iraq but \+as opposed to takmg out the ground forces along the front lmes m southern Kuwan The colonel was commced that If any one could 01 erthro\% Saddam It was the conscnpted army he \\ould leaI e as cannon fodder to replace tis elite Republican Guard mkaaon force when the latter pulled back from the front * @ 72) Powell responded \vlth the gmdance that the Iraq1 arm) must be destroyed and not nmplj allowed to withdraw From tlxs pomt fan, ard Warden planned for a second phase after the strategx attacks which would destroy the Iraq1 army Warden s debates \+nh other semor USAF officers mcludmg Lt General Charles Homer commander of U S &r Forces Central Command was not that the USAF would ignore the enemy army but that those attacks were seconw to the strategc effort The debate begun beh%een 
